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In May 2014 the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) hosted a workshop, co-
funded by NOREF and Christian Aid, designed to facilitate dialogue between scholars 
working on the political economy of drugs, conflict and development in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. The workshop explored how political economy perspectives, derived from 
long-term empirical research on drugs-affected regions, can enhance understanding of, 
and policy responses to, drug production and trafficking. This approach, rather than see-
ing drugs as “exceptional” and “criminal”, seeks to situate the role of illicit economies 
within broader processes of state formation and agrarian change.
Contributions to the workshop revealed the highly differentiated and context-specific 
 dynamics of drug economies, and how different configurations of institutions and security 
markets can lead to different kinds of relationships between drugs, statebuilding, agrar-
ian change and development. This research does not lend itself to simple policy narratives 
or prescriptions, but it does suggest that there can be no universal and de-contextualised 
solutions to “the drug problem”. Dogmatic and irreconcilable positions, adopted by both 
those advocating harsher prohibition and those arguing for blanket decriminalisation, fail 
to reflect sufficiently on the impacts such policies will have on drug-producing countries. A 
more grounded, comparative perspective is urgently needed in an arena where policies are 
often anything but evidence based and where data are patchy or politicised. Counter-nar-
cotic (CN) strategies, based on a reification of the perceived linkages between drugs, insta-
bility and state fragility, often provide only a partial, and in some cases deeply misleading, 
insight into the economic and political orders that emerge around drug production.
Political economy provides a corrective to these deeply entrenched biases and blind spots, 
by incorporating an analysis of aspects of drug economies and counter narcotics (CN) 
strategies that are frequently treated as residual or circumvented, including the varying 
levels and types of violence surrounding drug economies; the complex motives of those in-
volved in drug production and trafficking; the linkages between licit and illicit commodities 
in processes of agrarian transformation; the potential developmental outcomes of drugs 
economies; the relationship between illicit economies and differing configurations of 
authority and rule; and a socially differentiated account of who gains and who loses from 
counter-narcotics policies. In doing so, political economy approaches provide a powerful 
analytical lens for developing a more contextually attuned public policy on drugs.
 Executive summary
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A political economy approach to 
understanding illicit drug economies
Ever since the “war on drugs” was officially launched more 
than four decades ago, colossal sums of money have been 
invested in establishing and maintaining a global counter-
narcotics regime. Despite such investment, global drug 
production has continued to expand and counter-narcotics 
strategies have had deleterious effects on drug-producing 
countries. While counter-narcotics strategies have been 
significantly reformed, the underlying assumptions about 
the nature of the drug problem remain largely unchanged. 
These include the notion of drug exceptionalism, which 
reifies drugs and separates them from their social and 
political context; the rational actor explanatory model, 
which reduces the complex motivations of those involved to 
questions of price and profits; the idea that drug production 
and trafficking are inherent drivers of conflict, and causes 
of state fragility and underdevelopment of rural economies; 
and the belief that CN policies are exogenous to the 
dynamics of drugs production and trafficking – that they 
are an external “medicine” to an internal “disease”. This 
perspective fails to appreciate the way illicit economies are 
shaped by specific social relations and political institutions 
that vary across time and space.
A political economy approach, in contrast, aims to reveal 
the workings of power, not only through visible coercion 
and its direct effects, but also through the material basis of 
relationships that govern the distribution and use of 
resources, privileges and benefits. The political and the 
economic are therefore inseparable. Drugs, as a key source 
and vector of power, shape the institutions and mecha-
nisms of negotiation and coalition management. They are 
also central to trajectories of accumulation and investment 
and the workings of rural labour markets. Finally, CN 
policies and programmes are themselves resources which 
become entangled with, and are inseparable from, the 
dynamics of illicit economies in the developing world.
Drugs and agrarian change
An agrarian political economy of drug production considers 
the history of drug-producing regions and the social 
relations within these areas in order to understand the 
relationship between drug production and rural develop-
ment. Agrarian dynamics surrounding drug production 
involve social, economic, political and environmental 
conditions that are not captured by approaches to under-
standing drug production based on assumptions about 
utility-maximising individuals.
The workshop presentations showed that the agrarian 
dynamics of drug production interact with, reinforce or 
contest the advancement, consolidation or sustenance of 
capitalist relations of production, typically in borderlands of 
countries undergoing transition.
Across drug-producing regions, income generated from 
drugs has played a role in the commodification and 
economic integration of rural economies. Illicit drug econo-
mies have fostered agricultural expansion by opening up 
frontier zones, making previously uncultivated land 
commercially viable, and encouraging investment in 
clearing fields and coordinating the extension of transport 
and irrigation infrastructure (Burma, Colombia, Afghani-
stan). Trading networks stimulated by drug production have 
also served to monetise livelihoods, and created opportuni-
ties for accumulation for some, while marginalising others. 
Evidence from the cases suggests that drug production has 
the potential to transform labour markets (for example by 
stimulating seasonal migration and creating opportunities 
for wage labour).
Illicit drug economies have had a transformative role 
beyond drug production: in some cases, drug revenues 
finance other forms of agricultural intensification and 
diversification into off-farm activities. Drug economies 
entail the creation of systems of credit and taxation; trade 
and labour mobilisation networks emerge to support drug 
production. Understanding the impact of drug production 
on rural economies therefore requires policymakers to 
consider which groups are able to accumulate and the way 
drug revenue is reinvested and consumed (does it stay 
within local economies, is it transmitted to urban centres 
or does it move across borders?). Drug revenues buy 
political influence and shape power relations that extend 
beyond the confines of localised drug economies.
Alternatively, at least in some contexts, the particular 
spatial and economic characteristics of drug economies 
embody a dynamic of resistance, allowing some groups to 
resist or reverse dynamics of dispossession and proletari-
anisation linked with commodification and the expansion of 
the capitalist footprint. In such settings, drugs may provide 
the resource base for armed insurgencies and political 
opposition.
Both in those cases in which drug production bridges the 
integration of agricultural frontiers to the global market, as 
well as in those instances in which drug economies offer 
rural communities opportunities to retain land-based liveli-
hoods in an era of globalised and liberalised agriculture, 
agrarian dynamics of drug production are embedded in the 
broader question of the capitalist transition. A political 
economy approach reveals the differing trajectories of 
agrarian change in drug-producing contexts and their 
national and transnational linkages. These vary across 
time and space, from empowering resistance against 
capitalist expansion, to fostering parasitic forms of exploi-
tation and inequality, to catalysing new forms of rural 
development based on linkages between the licit and illicit 
economies.
In contrast, the rational actor model, which has under-
pinned alternative development approaches, seeks to 
3Noref occasional publication – october 2014
provide farmers with opportunities to grow other cash 
crops, while often ignoring the relationship between drug 
production and the broader social, economic, political and 
environmental milieu surrounding processes of agrarian 
change.
Drugs and processes of state 
formation
The political economy approach challenges the assumption 
that drug production and trafficking are necessarily 
indicators of state weakness. The fixation within the 
counter-narcotic narrative on the relationship between 
drugs, violence and state fragility has encouraged the 
growing integration of counter-narcotics strategies within a 
broader package of liberal peacebuilding policies focused 
on state stabilisation, the strengthening of law enforce-
ment agencies and perceived conflict-reduction mecha-
nisms. However, there are numerous contexts in which 
drug production flourishes within states that cannot be 
defined as weak or failing and in which there is clear 
interaction between state actors and the drug economy. 
The separation in counter-narcotics discourses between 
states and illicit economies reveals more about how 
policymakers believe states ought to function than about 
the empirical realities surrounding how state power is 
constructed, negotiated and reproduced.
State-building processes have to deal with the remnants of 
pre-existing structures of authority that remain powerful by 
drawing on resources generated through the combat and 
shadow economies. Drug production and trafficking have 
historically enabled the accumulation of power to develop 
patronage networks, facilitate loyalty and extend control 
over resources and populations. Processes of state forma-
tion may therefore revolve around attempts to manage and 
control the relationship between violence, drugs economies 
and power, rather than seeking to dismantle illicit econo-
mies outright.
Political accommodation and negotiation around illicit 
economies can lead to the creation of binding political 
coalitions, through which states can ultimately establish 
greater territorial control over commodities, populations 
and space. Controlling the allocation of drug rents, and 
also often the right to use violence, may therefore serve as 
a means through which negotiated statehood is estab-
lished, thus stabilising authority in regions hitherto beyond 
the reach of the state.
Such processes of state formation also reveal the impor-
tant, yet commonly overlooked, role played by powerful 
local actors, or brokers, who manage the interface between 
the central state and their communities. Engagement with 
these “autonomous state agents” minimises both the 
state’s employment of violent coercion and the threat of 
inciting opposition against growing state authority. Interna-
tional prohibitionist regimes have precluded forms of 
coalition building that could potentially engender linkages 
between local and regional power brokers and the state.
Clearly, as the case studies also show, drug production and 
trafficking may become antithetical to processes of 
state-building through the ability to finance and arm 
opposition groups, the role played by drugs rents in 
intensifying intra-elite competition, the distortionary 
impacts of illicit funds on election processes, and their 
potential to undermine state–society social contracts. 
Notwithstanding the many examples of negative impacts 
– many of which are at least partially linked to the perverse 
effects of counter-narcotics policies – it is imperative that 
policymakers recognise that it is not the presence of illicit 
drug production itself, but instead the institutional ar-
rangements and social relations surrounding production 
and trafficking, that determine the relationship between 
drugs, conflict and state consolidation/breakdown.
Policy implications
A political economy of illicit drug production poses chal-
lenging and complex questions, the answers to which 
evade any simplistic toolkit of policy responses or easily 
replicable models of best practice. However, engaging with 
questions of how illicit drug production is embedded within 
broader processes of agrarian change and state formation 
offers important insights to move beyond a simplistic, 
technocratic and depoliticised counter-narcotic policy.
1. Take history and context seriously. This has important 
methodological implications for the way CN policymak-
ers generate, analyse and use data, and also in terms of 
the kinds of expertise that is valued by institutions 
responsible for CN. Regional and political economy 
expertise have rarely been prioritised by such institu-
tions.
2. Account for the costs of CN policies, and who bears the 
costs, in a more systematic way. At the very least, 
policymakers should more explicitly incorporate a “do 
no harm” analysis in order to mitigate the negative 
impacts of their policies on drug-producing countries. 
For example, even explicitly non-militarised alternative 
development strategies have led to deleterious unin-
tended consequences for rural communities.
3. Move beyond state-centred frameworks. Policy interven-
tions, rather than responding systemically, tend to be 
“caged” by state-centred approaches, treating drug 
production as an economic pathology that can be 
isolated and compartmentalised. There is a need to 
think and act, above and below the state. Of particular 
importance is the role of borderland regions, and 
policies related to drugs and development need to be 
far more cognisant of the particular challenges and 
needs of such regions.
4. Consider the tensions and trade-offs between different 
forms of intervention. For example, there may be 
fundamental incompatibilities between counter-narcot-
ics policies, state-building processes and pro-poor 
development strategies. Such tensions need to be made 
more explicit and there needs to be greater engage-
ment with the ways in which other interventions 
designed to further objectives such as counter-insur-
gency, peacebuilding, state-building, economic integra-
tion and border control may also have profound impacts 
upon drug economies and local livelihoods.
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